follows from this truth that, when our knowledge of the human mind shall have become an adequate and Well-established science, that science must be the theoretic basis for all who are practically concerned with the working of the mind, whether they are chiefly and immediately concerned with the normal mind or with minds in disorder.
But, as I shall presently show, it is just because we have hitherto had no such psychology, that there has been growing up of late years a specialized form of mental science which may conveniently be designated clinical psychology. There can, I think, be little doubt that a century hence the present time will be held to be remarkable for the great advances made in our understanding of the mind, and it will be recognized with gratitude that clinicians have played a great and leading part in this achievement. My purpose is to attempt a rough sketch of the way in which this achievement of the clinical psychologists will appear to the historian of science in that future age.
In order to understand the rise of clinical psychology as a semiindependent body of thought, we must glance at the state of academic psychology in the later decades of last century. There is some foundation for the jibe that there were then as many psychologies as psychologists; yet there were certain doctrines which, especially in the psychologies that claimed to be scientific rather than philosophical, dominated the scene.
The chief of these were: (1) A tomism, or Sensatibnism; (2) Associationism; (3) Hedonism.
Sensatioitism, the theory that all mental states, broadly spoken of as presentations or ideas, are aggregates formed by the compounding or clustering together of smaller fragments of conscious stuff, the elementary sensations; one idea differing from another merely in the number and variety of the units of sensation combined in it (hence the name mind-dust theory).
Associationism, the theory that all this compounding and clustering of units to form ideas, as well as all the successioh and interplay of ideas, was ruled by the one great principle of association.
These two great principles were natural complements, and, therefore, were almost inevitably and everywhere combined. This com-*bination was very widely accepted, owing not only to the seductive simplicity of the notion, but still more perhaps to the fact that it lent itself to combination with the increasing knowledge of the structure of the brain, to form a purely mechanical and materialistic theory of mental life. For the mental elements were regarded as being functions of the brain-elements or cells, as the sound of a plucked string is a function of the string; and the ideas or clusters of elements were likened to the chord heard when many strings are plucked or sounded together.
Association was a function of the connexions between brain-cells; and all the, play of ment4l life was but a matter of the ringing up of braincells and groups of cells by the spreading of the nervous impulse from group to group, according to the simple principles of mechanical association.
British thinkers, Locke, Hartley, the Mills, Bain and Herbert Spencer, to mention only a few of the most distinguished, were chiefly responsible for the immense success of these two principles.
Section of Psychiatry
To some thinkers these two principles alone seemed sufficient to account for all thought and all action; for to wil.l was to have an idea of an action or movement, and these ideas of movement were, like all others, subject only to the great law of association. This was the theory of ideo-motor action, dearly beloved of so many of our French colleagues, and unduly emphasized by many of them. But others could not overlook the.fact that men commonly act, not merely because an idea of action comes into their minds, but because they have a purpose, seek some end, or strive to achieve some effect; and, looking round for some formula to define that end, they said-It is pleasure! In acting, in seeking, in striving, men, they said, are always moved by the desire of pleasure. There you have the third great principle of Hedonism.
The psychologies which did not base themselves upon these principles were in the inain highly metaphysical and not such as to engage the attention of physicians struggling with the problems of mental and nervous disorder. And so we find that these physicians adopted, almost without exception, the mechanistic psychology founded on Atomism, Association, and Hedonism. This psychology, however, was wholly inadequate to the needs of psychiatrists. Its specious principles afforded little or no help when brought to the practical test of use in the interpretation of mental disorder.
And the natural consequence of its acceptance by psychiatrists was that those among them who were moved to research devoted themselves almost wholly to the attempt to discover the mnaterial basis, the neuropathology, of mental disease; this tendency being strongest where the mechailistic psychology was best established-namely, in England and Scotland. While the practical physician used the psychology of common sense and common speech, supplemented by his own intuition and large experience of men; a condition of affairs illustrated by the majority of the older text-books still in use. I will further illustrate the position by reference to the writings of three leaders of psychological medicine, in Germany, France, and England respectively. Professor Ziehen, whose works have enjoyed a wide citculation, represents the pure principles of mechanistic materialistic psychology based on the three principles mentioned above. His psychology claimns to be a physiological psychology; in reality it is a speculative and highly dubious brain-physiology which for psychiatry is utterly sterile. Psychology of this sort seemed at one time to have achieved a 3triumph in its ,interpretation of the varieties of aphasia, but it is, I think, now generally recognized that this triumph was illusory, and that in the main it obscured and distorted the facts.
Professor Pierre Janet may justly claim to be the father or founder of clinical psychology. Starting with the principles of the mechanistic psychology, and, like other French writers, attaching grieat importance to the notion of ideo-motor action, he greatly developed the conception of mental dissociation. But valuable as was this contribution, his work would have remained on the purely descriptive plane, had he not broken away from the mechanistic psychology by introducing a new conception quite incompatible with it-namely, he conceived the mind to be pervaded by a synthetic energy, variable in quantity, whose function is to hold together in one stream of consciousness the various sensory elements, and in defect of which dissociation of consciousness into partial streams occurs.
In this country, the transition from old to new doctrine which I am attempting to sketch is illustrated in the most striking way by the work of Dr. C. Mercier. This brilliant writer, after having expounded the mechanistic psychology, with great force and confidence, has made the discovery that in presence of all problems of action it leaves us utterly helpless. Thereupon, instead of undertaking a radical revision of his psychology, he announces our need of a new and distinct science -namely, a science of conduct (which he proposes to call praxiology)and writes a new volume to lay the foundations of this much needed science. No happier, illustration of the inadequacy and sterility of the mechanistic psychology could be found. In taking this course Dr. Mercier was unconsciously following the example of John .Stuart Mill, who began by adopting and expounding the purely mechanistic psychology of his father; and then, discovering, like Dr. Mercier, that it threw no light on problems of conduct and of character, sketched out a new science to fill this gap, proposing to call it Ethology. Thus does history repeat itself even in the realm of science.
These three thinkers I have cited fairly represent the many others who have vainly striven to bring the mechanistic psychology to the aid of medicine. No wonder, then, that others have thrown aside all academic psychology in approaching the problems of the disordered mind; and it is perhaps well that they have done so; for their relative freedom from the paralysing shackles of the mechanistic psychology has enabled them to make progress; but their repudiation of all academic psychology has inevitably resulted in those peculiarities of the clinical psychology of our time which mark it off from the main stream of psychological tradition and development. This method of approach and these consequences are best illustrated by the work of Professor S. Freud, who, whatever verdict may ultimately be passed on his psycho-therapeutic methods, will certainly rank as one who has given a great impulse to psychological inquiry. Freud's psychological work may be said, from the logical point of view, to have begun from the wrong end. Without any preliminary attempt to consider first principles of mental life, to analyse consciousness, or even to define 'the terms which he uses, this daring and original inquirer has wrestled at first hafid with the problems of conduct and especially with the problems of disordered conduct as presented to him by his patients in all their concreteness and complexity. Thus approaching, he has been deeply impressed by the great fact that much of human conduct, both normal and abnormal, proceeds not from consciously reasoned motives nor from any chain of association of clear ideas, but from a great impelling force that works within us, expressing itself only very obscurely in consciousness as vague feeling and uneasiness. This he has recognized as the sexual impulse; and, having been deeply impressed by the far-reaching effects of this upon conduct, and by the obscure and devious modes of its operation, he has gone on to bring under the same heading whatever. other forces of a similar nature he has seemed to detect as co-operating with and subserving it, or which the vagueness of common speech seems in any way to to connect with it. In this way, in his reaction from the mechanistic psychology, he has brought to light two great allied facts: (1) The impulsive, demoniac, illogical nature of much of human thought and conduct;
(2) the very partial and inadequate way in which consciousness or self-consciousness reflects or represents the workings of this impulsive force. Freud's insistence on these two facts is his fundamental contribution to psychology; and it is the recognition and emphasis of them, thanks largely to his labours, that is the key-note of clinical psychology at the present time.
Freud's development of these two truths has been marred by several errors: First, his attribution to the sexual impulse of much of conduct that is not properly so attributable, and his consequent exaggeration of the role of sex; secondly, he has not wholly freed himself from the errors of the mechanistic psychology, in spite of his detachment from tradition, so natural are these errors to the scientific mind; two especially he has retained-(a) instead of repudiating the mechanistic determinism, he claims that he has for the first time established this principle in psychology; (b) instead of repudiating Hedonismn he has made it his own and attempted to combine it with his recognition of the impulsive nature of conduct, as what he calls the pleasure principle, in a very confusing way that largely vitiates his thinking. A third great blemish is, that, having repudiated the traditional terminology of psychology and having neglected to define his own terms by careful analysis, his terminology is often obscure and lmtisleading, and, as a further consequence, the large unanalysed conceptions with which he operates tend to become anthropomorphic agencies-the unconscious, the cenisor, the foreconscious, &c.
But in spite of these large blemishes and beyond the two fundamental principles we may, I think, see in his work permanent contributions to psychology which are of especial value to clinical psychology and are playing a great part in its development. Notably (1) the conception of active continued repression of distressing memories; a conception distinct from and much more fertile than the dissociation of Janet; (2) the conception of conflict in the mind going on below the threshold of consciousness and capable of giving rise to disorder of thought and conduct; (3) the symbolical significance of some dreams and of some forms of waking thought and conduct, and the value of these as indicators of conflict and repression; (4) the conception of the " affect " as a quantity of energy that attaches to ideas and gives them their impulsive force in the determination of thought and conduct.
Let us now glance at the way in which others have contributed to the further development of these lines of thought. I refer first to Adler, who, working by methods similar to Freud's, has diverged widely from him. His chief contribution has been to secure recognition by clinical psychology of two great impulses which seem to have escaped the notice of Freud. He has recognized the great part in human life of an impulse of self-assertion, and of one of only less importance, an impulse of self-abasement or submission; and, applying to these what may. perhaps without impropriety be called the Freudian method in psychology, he has assigned them an immense r6le, and seeks to show that their distorted working is the source of all' the 'neuroses, just as Freud finds that source in the sex-impulse. And, though he has without doubt exaggerated their r6le in the neuroses, we must forgive this natural exaggeration in gratefully recognizing that he has secured recognition by clinical psychology of these two important impulses.
An English clinician has in a similar way secured recognition for another great impulse. Mr. W. Trotter has discovered the gregarious impulse and, in a brilliant and persuasive little book, has treated it by the Freudian method, that is to *ay, postulating this impulse, without first stopping to inquire-What is its nature? What are the limits and scope of its action ? but, sweeping into its province whatever human activities are social or in any way dependent upon or related to the social groupings of mankind, he has made it appear as the mainspring of well-nigh all human activity, normal and pathological.
An American clinician has performed a similar service in regard to yet another fundamental impulse of the human mind. Dr. Boris Sidis has, by applying the Freudian method, sought to show that fear is the source of all the psychoneuroses, all those troubles of thought and conduct which Freud attributes to the sex-impulse, and Adler to the self-assertive tendency and its opposite. And, though, like them, he must be judged to have overdone his part and proved too much, he yet may claim the credit of having given to fear a secure place in clinical psychology. But this place has been overwhelmingly established by the observations of a large number of physicians upon the psychoneuroses of war; for they have learnt that many, if not all, of the modes of neurosis may be generated by the terrifying experiences of the battlefield, that is by fear, or, as they commonly prefer to call it, by the instinct of self-preservation. Thus fear takes its place alongside sex, self-assertion, and the gregarious impulse, as one of the great impelling forces of thought and conduct, which work independently of the promptings of pleasure and-override the principles of mechanical association,
We may, I think, assume that clinical psychology has not yet come to an end of its advance along this line, and may confidently expect that there remain other fundamental impulses of like nature to be discovered by it playing their parts in the genesis of mental and nervous disorders. Now, it is of the essence of these great fundamental impulses, thus revealed as the underlying motive powers of so much of thought and action, both normal and abnormal, that they are purposive or teleological, and are not to be deterred by pain nor turned aside from their biological ends by pleasure. They override and dominate for their own purposes all the mechanisms of association and the Hedonistic influences. Therefore, their recognition in clinical psychology necessarily leads to a complete break with the mechanistic psychology. Freud's own teachings show clearly the purposive character of much in human conduct that had been regarded as merely the fortuitous outcome of mechanical haphazard association; that in fact is rightly claimed by-his disciples as one of his greatest achievements. Thus he has himself undermined both the mechanistic determinism and the Hedonism which he professes to maintain. And, although clinical psychologists commonly use the phrase " mental mechanisms," this is only for lack of a better mode of expression ; and some of them have grasped the radical transformation of psychology that must result from the recognition of the great rWle of these primary impulses; a transformation from the deterministic mechanical psychology to a teleological and indeterministic psychology, a radical transformation, because, in spite of the ingenuity of German metaphysicians, mechanical process and purposive action remain utterly and fundamentally different. Most notable among these is Dr. C. J. Jung, who in his " Analytical Psychology" has forcibly shown the practical clinical importance of this revolution, insisting that, so Long as we regard the symptoms of our nervous patients as wholly and mechanically determined by the past, we miss their true significance and render our psycho-therapy relatively sterile; he insists that we have constantly to bear in mind in all our procedures the fact that conduct is determined by ideals of the future that we strive towards, as well as by the events of the past.
Jung also has made a further great step of a more speculative kind. Repudiating the excessive sexualism of Freud and insisting upon the importance of the food-seeking impulse, especially in childhood, he regards all the primary impulses as differentiations of one fundamental energy, the life force which sustains all our strivings, both conscious and unconscious; thus approaching, but from a very different direction, the conception of the Ilan vital which the greatest of contemporary thinkers, Professor Bergson, has so eloquently expounded.
Turn now for a moment to that other distinctive feature of-clinical psychology-the increasing recognition of the part played in conduct and mental life by processes that remain hidden from consciousness. It is difficult to make any general statements about this, because the greatest obscurity and confusion still reign. The facts have not been brought to light by clinical psychologists alone. Others have been impressed by their importance-and have prepared the way: Schopenhauer and Hartmann, and F. W. H. Myers notably. Janet, with his conception of dissociated sensations and ideas, has attempted to give greater precision to the conception of unconscious mental process; and others who, like Janet, have made large use of hypnosis have brought forward, as justifying the conception, all the striking facts of post-hypnotic suggestion. Morton Prince especially, following in the line of Janet, has striven to introduce some clarity into the vagueness which enshrouds this region, by his demonstrations of co-conscious personalities and co-conscious ideas; and to my mind he seems to have made out his case for the tru.th of these conceptions in certain abnormal cases. But his conception dqes not cover the whole ground; it does not cover the unconscious or subconscious operations of normal life; and on these Freud has rightly insisted.
The reality, the richness, and the importance of these subconscious operations of the mind have been brought home to many of us with a new force by our experience of the functional disorders of warfare; for no one working among these cases can have failed to come across many instances in which the symptoms, both -bodily and mentalamnesias, war-dreams, phobias, anxiety states, paralyses, contractures, epileptiform seizures, headaches, tics, have been undeniably traceable to emotional conflicts and repressed tendencies and ideas, which have operated wholly or partly beneath or without the clear consciousness of the patient;
But Freud and most of his disciples have followed in the line of the Unconscious " of Hartmann, of Myers' " Subliminal Self," and the "Unconscious Mind " of other authors-that is to say, they have tended to confuse together in one unanalysed mass whatever contents *and operations of the mind are not clearly conscious at each moment, and to make of this an anthropomorphic entity, a demon, a god in the machine, whose natuire and powers remain entirely unlimited and incomprehensible. And Jung and his followers seem to me to fall in some degree into the same error. I say error, because this way of treating of "The Unconscious" seems to me unscientific; it tends towards a vaguely mystical attitude which, however much in 'place in religious or metaphysical thinking, does not directly promote, but rather checks, further scientific inquiry into this problem.' I venture to think that this error is again the outcome of the contamination of clinical psychology with the fallacies of the mechanistic psychology, which it professes to repudiate. For that psychology, all mental life was a succession of clearly conscious ideas. It ignored the fact that these ideas are but the eddies and ripples on the surface of a stream, deep within which are the currents and forces of which those eddies and ripples afford only very imperfect indications. This truth is manifested all down the scale of animal life-the instinctive strivings of the animals generally bring them surely to their biological ends, without clear consciousness either of those ends, or of the means by which they are achieved, or of the objects which, by impressing their senses, guide their successive steps. And it is not otherwise with man; he also is borne on to his biological ends, for the most part but dimly conscious of those ends or of the mental forces and processes by which he achieves them. i Just because the mechanistic psychology had ignored these surging hidden streams of the life force, those who, revolting from its inadequacies, have found themselves confronted by evidence of their reality in man, have been startled by the revelation and have seemed to see beneath the only form of mind recognized by the older psychology another system of forces greater and more mysterious, which they have thus been led to regard as a distinct mind or entity-The Unconscious, the Subliminal or Subconscious Self.
A third way in which clinical psychology is diverging widely from the mechanistic psychology is by its discovery of the mind's wealth of innate endowment. The mechanisticpsychology inherited Locke's dogma that each mind starts out upon its course of individual experience as a tabula rasa, a blank sheet on which experience writes as chance determines.
The recognition of the primary or instinctive impulses, of which we have already spoken, carries clinical psychology a long way beyond this primitive and untenable position, showing the strong native bias of the mind to select and react upon impressions fromn the outer world, not only according to its individual past experience, but also and chiefly accordi-ng to its inherited constitution. But among clinical psychologists there is a strong tendency to go further than this, to believe that much of the development of the individual mind is literally a recapitulation of the racial mind, a gradual unfolding at the touch of experience of modes of thinking and feeling and doing gradually acquired by many generations of ancestors. Only by this assumption can they explain the striking uniformity of symptoms which characterize certain mental disorders, and the equally striking uniformity of thinking and feeling revealed by primitive myth and custom among the most diverse races of mankind.
This line of work in clinical psychology promises to contribute very importantly towards two of the greatest problems that confront the human. intellect-one strictly biological, the other of more general and philosophical import.
The one is the problem of heredity. If that wealth of inherited forms of thought and feeling, towards which clinical psychology seems strongly to point at present should be further substantiated, this result will decide the issue of the great controversy between those who deny and those who affirm the inheritance of acquired characters. For while it may, perhaps, be plausibly maintained that a few simple instinctive modes of feeling and action may have been impressed upon the race by natural selection alone, every demonstration of a greater richness of this inherited structure of the mind renders this explanation more hopelessly inadequate and drives us back upon the Neo-Lamarckian view, that the experience of each generation impresses itself enduringly upon the race.
The other great problem is that of the constitution of man, the agelong controversy between materialism and what in the widest sense may be called spiritualism. For so long as it is held, with the mechanistic psychology, that congenitally the mind is a tabula rasa and the brain little more than a mass of indifferent nerve-tissue waiting to be moulded by impressions from the outer world, it may seem plausible to hold that all mental potentialities are somehow comprised in the material structure of the germ-plasm. But, with every addition to the demonstrable wealth of innate mental powers and tendencies, this hypothesis becomes more impossible and incredible. And it may safely be affirmed that, if anything like the wealth of innate endowment claimed now by some-e.g., by Jung in his latest work-should become well established, then all the world would see that the materialistic hypothesis is outworn and outrun, and that each man is bound to his race and ancestry by links which, conceive them how we may, are certainly of such a nature that in principle they can never be apprehended by the senses, no matter how refined and indefinitely augmented by the ultramicroscope or by the utmost refinements of physical chemistry. I venture to insist upon this contribution of clinical psychologists towards the solution of these great problems, because few of them seem to have adequa,tely realized the bearing of their work on these issues, which so far transcend in interest even the fascinating and important questions with which they are more directlv concerned.
There are many other features of interest in the present position on which I might dwell if time allowed. I have had time to touch only on these few which seem to me the most significant. I have said nothing of the burning questions of method in psycho-therapy, and to do so would perhaps be presumption on my part. But I would like to say one word in the nature of a warning criticism. We are repeatedly. asked to accept satisf,ctory clinical results not only as evidence of the value of the therapeutic methods applied, but also as evidence of the truth of the psychological doctrines on which they claim to be based. The whole history of medicine seems to me to show the danger and the fallacy of this claim. How many accepted therapeutic procedures have been shown to be worthless! How many others, whose value has been proved, have been founded upon, or held to prove the truth of, hypotheses which are for ever dead. And we are relieved from any compulsion to accept such evidence when we notice that the exponents of different methods, based upon different psychological doctrines, claim equally brilliant therapeutic results in the same class of cases; and how even the same clinical worker continues to achieve equally brilliint therapeutic results before and after a radical chang, of doctrine and procedure. I insist on this as a warning against dogmatism, as an appeal for mutual tolerance and the open mind in this great field where we all wander, groping more or less blindly, among the deepest mysteries of Nature.
I have tried to hint that clinical psychology, now launched upon a great career, is in the position of a brilliant and wayward child, which, throwing aside the traditional wisdom of its parent as of no account, sets forth to acquire a new wisdom ab initio and which, though making great strides, is hampered through retaining all unawares some of the prejudices and errors that it believes to have put off. And this brillidnt child, as it advances, will inevitably find that there was truth as well as error in that parental wisdom. For the mechanistic psychology was not the whole or even the better part of psychology, it was the work of a sect, a series of persuasive and brilliant writers, who evolved it by deduction from principles set up by physical science, rather than by the patient and detailed study of human and animal life; and it enjoyed a great vogue because it harmonized with the materialistic'tendencies of the great age of physical discovery. But we are now in the age of biological discovery, and, since Darwin initiated this new age, there has been growing up a biological and inductive psychology, a science not springing full blown, like the psychology of James Mill, or of Herbert Spencer, from the reasonings of one powerful mind,' but a science, based like other sciences on a vast mass of minute and careful observation, a slowly growing product of the co-operation of a multitude of workers. This science is showing the same main tendencies, the same trends, as clinical psychology. And it is a bigger thing than clinical psychology because it is based upon a wider field of observation and induction; it is greater as the whole is greater than the part. Clinical psychology cannot afford to ignore-this greater stream and to remain in splendid isolation. It 'is to be hoped that it will renounce the effort to do so, that the brilliant child will return to the parental fold, bringing rich gifts, but gaining. in return a greater breadth of view, a greater sanity and balance, a more-precise terminology, a greater clarity of thought, and with these, a greater power of dealing effectively with-those most distressing of the disorders th'at afflict mankind, the nervous and mental diseases.
The Methods of Psychotherapy.'
By BERNARD HART, M.D.
THE urgent problems presented to us by the war psychoneuroses have naturally led to a greatly increased interest in psychotherapy, and to the devising of many new psychotherapeutic procedures. So numerous and so apparently diverse have these procedures become that a superficial glance at the rapidly growing literature might lead one to suppose that the methods of psychotherapy are legion, and that any attempt to collate and compare them must necessarily be a task of great complexity and difficulty. A closer inspection shows, however, that all the available methods are ultimiately dependent upon the employment of one or other of three basic principles, and that they differ only in the extent to which these principles are combined, and in the particular technique by which they are applied. These three basic principles are suggestion, persuasion, and analysis.
Certain schools of thought profess to rely entirely or almost entirely upon one only of the three, and name the method they practice according to the principle selected. Thus Babinski, and the many followers of Babinski who. have arisen in this country since the War, employ suggestion, Dubois and Dejerine advocate persuasion, while Freud, and the schools which have developed directly or I At a meeting of the Section, held December-10, 1918. at SAGE Publications on June 21, 2016 jrs.sagepub.com Downloaded from
